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In this paper I want to examine two prominent cases of global governance in the light of 
recent developments in Science and Technology Studies (STS). Specifically reflecting on the 
role of expertise in decision making processes in the cases of ozone layer protection and 
climate change, I will try to develop some lessons that could be applied to other cases such as 
international forestry. All three cases have in common that they are posing the problem of 
international cooperation in the face of uncertainty. National interests and national 
sovereignty are as important as knowledge claims about a global common good (or common 
pool resources, cf. Ostrom, 1990.While the cases of ozone politics and climate change have 
been studied extensively by social scientists and led to several international treaties, forests 
have received little attention in comparison. It seems appropriate to relate some of the 
findings from the literature on global atmospheric commons to the case of forestry. I will do 
this by introducing influential models of conceiving knowledge and expertise in the process 
of political decision making (Section 2), then presenting the cases of ozone layer protection 
(Section 3) and climate change (Section 4). In section 5 I will draw some conclusions and 
then address the issue of forestry (Section 6). 
 
2. Knowledge and politics 
 
Modern societies are increasingly dependent on knowledge. They are characterized by the 
development and dissemination of knowledge, by a multitude of knowledge sources and high 
levels of scientific literacy. The term Knowledge Society has been coined to describe them 
(Stehr, 1994). However, the term knowledge society does not necessarily imply that society 
in general (and politics in particular) is now, in contrast to previous eras, informed by more 
and better knowledge and therefore more ‘rational’ (Beck, 1992). Such an assumption would 
presuppose (1) that knowledge is unambiguous, (2) that it can be applied in a more or less 
direct way and (3) that its results are useful or desirable for society. This is the traditional 
view known as the linear model of knowledge production and application. According to this 
view, knowledge is first generated as basic research and removed from considerations of 
application. This leads to a ‘true’ description of reality. Then it becomes applied knowledge, 
knowledge specified to solve specific problems. Finally it is put into practice through 
engineering devices or decision making in politics and business (Bush, 1945). There are 
various versions of this model, some describe it in terms of diffusion or trickling down, 
others in terms of translation and transfer. 
The linear model has an inbuilt assumption that decision making is rational. In essence, it is 
assumed that decision makers will alter their practices on the basis of new information. Or at 
least, it is assumed that decision making should be rational, i.e. the ‘barriers’ to this 
mechanism should be removed. Examples of such barriers are manifold, including ignorance 
of practitioners, vested interests, unavailability of data, or ideological factors.  
The linear model also assumes that knowledge will have real effects, that it is instrumental. 
Knowledge is a reflection of reality and embodies causal relations that will hold true in new 
applications. This assumption is based on the belief that the conditions of application will be 
neutral to the supposed functioning of knowledge. 
In the past three decades much work in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) 
has been published showing that science is not separate from society and that it does not 
discover uncontested ‘truths’ that are then translated into technologies or policies. Rather, we 
have to assume a co-production of scientific claims, political decisions and social order 
(Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998; Jasanoff, 2004). 
Such observations challenge the imagery of science as being separate from and neutral to 
societal interests. Researchers have proposed new ways of conceptualising the relation 
between science and society. One major concern in recent years has been the role of lay 
participation in science based policy decisions (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993; Gibbons et al., 
1994; Jasanoff, 1990; Irwin, 1995; Liberatore and Funtowicz, 2003; Nowotny et al., 2001; 
Lengwiler, 2008). One can also see a civic engagement of scientific experts in such debates. 
In increasing numbers scientists are leaving their laboratories and lecture halls in order to 
take part in political debates about the future of science and the social consequences of 
scientific developments. Some scientists represent a body of knowledge that is highly policy 
relevant, and at the same time is informed by normative beliefs and values. They have been 
defined as ‘popularizers or advocates who bridge environmentalism and science’ 
(Hannigan,1995). Advocacy scientists' claims are likely to be taken up if media attention goes 
up, and if the issue can be dramatized by symbolic and visual means (Ungar, 1992). 
The above has several implications for decision making and governance. According to the 
linear model, it would seem that ‘getting the science right’ is precondition for good policies. 
Sound science will help to put an end to ongoing political and ideological debates. Reducing 
scientific uncertainty leads to political consensus and ‘good policy decisions’. 
According to STS studies, facts and values are intertwined and uncertainty is a constitutive 
feature of knowledge, as is the fragility of the societal contexts within which such knowledge 
must operate. There is no such thing as scientific knowledge removed from society and 
politics. Knowledge production always occurs in political and ideological contexts. However, 
it must never present itself as such. In order to be legitimate knowledge, it has to be purified 
of such mundane links. Latour (1993) uses the conceptual pair of hybridisation and 
purification to describe this process. Purification means a clear separation of nature from 
society, while hybridization involves mixtures of nature and culture. Latour claims that it is a 
modern belief that the human and non-human worlds can be separated and exist independent 
from each other, each in a pure form. Applied to knowledge production this means that facts 
(about nature) and values (about we ought to do) are seen as separate in the modern world 
view but bound up with each other in reality.  
One might suspect that the more knowledge is produced in hybrid arrangements, the more the 
protagonists will insist on the integrity, even veracity of their findings.  
Stressing the role of interpretation and judgement in the work of scientific advisors, Jasanoff 
(1990: 229) observed that ‘experts themselves seem at times painfully aware that what they 
are doing is not ‘science’ in any ordinary sense, but a hybrid activity that combines elements 
of scientific evidence and reasoning with large doses of social and political judgment.’ This is 
meant to apply to scientists in their role as policy advisors. If we apply it to advocacy 
scientists we see that a specific course of action is advocated, typically with urgency and in 
public fora. Usually advocates are motivated by genuine concerns about the future of society 
and the environment. They also share the view contained in the linear model that science 
dictates policy. 
As a result of the growing importance of scientific expertise for decision making several 
problems have been identified (e.g. Haas, 2004; Oreskes et al., 1994; Pielke, 2007): 
- Scientific consensus is often suspect because the scientists themselves are part of a 
broader cultural discourse, and thus lack autonomy or independent stature; 
- Science has become extremely politicized. The use of science is mediated and thus 
possibly distorted by the political goals of potential users; 
- Science may not be sufficiently simple for the needs of policymakers; 
- Science may provide advice that is out of synch with the political plans of decision-
makers or parliaments, and thus be dismissed; 
- There is an over-reliance on models based on the assumption that models would 
mimic reality; 
- There is an over-selling of scientific results based on the assumption that science 
could speak truth to power. 
 
Roger Pielke Jr. (2007) has argued that in order to improve policy decision making processes 
one should pay closer attention to the potential of ‘honest brokers’ who—unlike advocates—
would increase the number of options for policy makers. My suspicion is that neither the 
advocate nor the honest broker can escape the tension of hybridization and purification. In 
what follows I will demonstrate that the case of ozone depletion was characterized by a 
constellation of industry lobby vs. advocates whereas the case of global climate change is 
characterized by an institutionalized assessment structure. In both cases the processes of 
hybridization and purification have been evident, albeit in different ways. 
 
3. Ozone layer protection 
 
In June 1974, two chemists of the University of California at Irvine published an article in 
Nature, in which they put forward the hypothesis that CFCs could damage the ozone layer. 
This so-called Molina–Rowland-Hypothesis called for a revision of the long believed 
harmlessness of CFCs which were very popular both with producers and consumers of many 
domestic and industrial appliances, since they seemed to be chemically inert, non-toxic and 
non corrosive. According to the Molina–Rowland-Hypothesis, CFCs could deplete 
stratospheric ozone and hence lead to an increase in UV-B radiation which in turn would 
have severe effects on biological systems (skin cancer in humans, crop damage, algae 
diminution) and on global climate.  
From the beginning, there was controversy between the proponents of this hypothesis and 
industry. The proponents were supported by other scientists, environmentalists and policy-
makers. They believed that although little was known, it was enough to warrant controls. 
Following the wait-and-see principle, those against CFC controls demanded more time for 
scientific research before addressing the question of controls. Needless to say that vested 
interests were backing this position, but also some scientists and decision-makers.  
On June 30, 1975, the Du Pont Company ran a full-page ad in the New York Times and 
declared: ‘Should reputable evidence show that some fluorocarbons cause a health hazard 
through depletion of the ozone layer, we are prepared to stop production of the offending 
compounds.’ In the following years, Du Pont took great pains to make this point, namely that 
reputable evidence was not available. In the same ad the company spelled out the programme 
for the coming decade: ‘Claim meets counterclaim. Assumptions are challenged on both 
sides. And nothing is settled.’ A fight for scientific authority and credibility (in Latour’s 
terminology: ‘public trials of strength’) ensued which put industry on the defensive. 
DuPont's statement gave scientific research an important role in the whole process. After the 
discovery of abnormally low ozone levels over Antarctica (later known as ‘the ozone hole’) in 
1985, more and more actors (including scientists) were convinced that something had to be 
done quickly—even in the absence of scientific proof. DuPont's statement also had a self-
binding effect: in 1986 the company signalled that it would no longer oppose international 
controls. However, it has to be born in mind that the reputable evidence was the observed 
damage of the ozone hole (and its potential catastrophic consequences) that convinced 
DuPont (Grundmann, 2001; Rowland, 2001). 
 
3.1. Involvement and objectivity of scientists 
 
An early opponent of CFC regulations, James Lovelock, acknowledges the role played by 
advocate scientists, especially by Rowland: ‘If Rowland hadn't been so missionary about this 
it would never have developed to this point. If it would have been treated objectively, 
scientifically, as I would have liked to have seen it done, it probably would never have been 
treated as a serious issue by the public and by politicians. If he hadn't stirred up the Greens 
and the politicians. He must have spent an enormous amount of his time and effort going 
around lecturing, talking. He really barnstormed. He went to every little town and every little 
community, delivering his speech. I thought this isn't the way to do science, but I think he 
was probably right, because he believed in it’ (Author interview with James Lovelock, 30 
May 1995). 
A problem arises for the scientific advocates: they are accused of betraying the ideals of 
science. Their public role entails ‘popularising’ scientific findings, taking sides in a political 
controversy and making policy recommendations. However, none of the scientists active in 
this field of research could avoid asking (or being asked) questions such as: Who has the 
burden of proof? What is a reasonable evidence of damage? Who should make judgements on 
these issues? How should one weigh ‘worst case’ scenarios? What weight should be given to 
social or economic benefits when considering regulation? (Brooks, 1982). Those were also 
the questions which had to be answered when political options were formulated—scientists 
and politicians alike had to find responses. 
The scientists who were involved in the CFC controversy ‘found themselves unable to avoid 
making explicit or implicit judgements about almost every one of these essentially non-
scientific value questions, no matter how much they tried to ‘stick to the facts’’ (Brooks, 1982: 
206). At hearings before a Congress subcommittee Rowland gave priority to ecological 
concerns when asked to rank them with economic interests: ‘I think that the economic 
dislocation need to be given minimal weight compared to the maximum weight to the 
possible harm to the environment’ (cited after Grundmann, 2001, p.73). 
The advocacy scientists succeeded in presenting the case in a convincing way in public 
discussions, with school classes, during parliamentary hearings, and in media broadcasts. 
They also put forward a kind of ‘political strategy’ for the protection of the ozone layer. In the 
1970s it was the proposal to replace CFC in spray cans which led to a growing concern about 
these substances in the United States, on the part of both consumers and lawmakers. This 
would be followed by a call for a ban on all CFCs after 1985. 
In view of the uncertainties in the model calculations, there was indeed no purely scientific 
method to decide whether CFCs should be regulated, and if so, how strictly. Here each side 
had its own reading. Industry followed the slogan ‘innocent until proven guilty’, while the 
critics deduced the need for extraordinary precautionary measures. The question was whether 
the uncertainties of the computer models represented an argument for or against regulation. 
An error factor of two in the models meant that the problem could be either half as big or, just 
as easily, twice as big, as the atmospheric scientist Ralph Cicerone stressed at the Congress 
Hearings. Uncertainty cuts both ways.  
The Clean Air Act of 1977 institutionalized a precautionary approach by banning CFCs in 
‘non-essential applications’ (e.g. spray cans). Of central importance was the proviso that ‘no 
conclusive proof … but a reasonable expectation’ was sufficient to justify taking action. 
Thismove was going to define US policy for the international negotiations (Betsill and Pielke, 
1998). 
A second aspect needs emphasizing here. The ‘spray can ban’ was enacted on the basis of a 
scientific hypothesis and model calculations about future ozone loss. No actual data on 
atmospheric change had been available at the time. Industry relentlessly pointed out that it 
was fundamentally opposed to the idea to regulate an industrial product on the basis of ‘pure 
theory’.  
 
3.2. Global initiatives 
 
At the beginning of the 1980s, ozone depletion entered the agenda of international 
environmental policy making. Until 1986, the opponents of regulations repeated their 
position that too little was known to justify regulations. More scientific research was deemed 
necessary to remedy this lack of understanding. They were right in stating that little was 
known about the atmosphere. This became clear when the Antarctic ozone hole was 
discovered since no theoretical model had predicted this phenomenon. It took more than two 
years until it could be explained scientifically. But is (relative) ignorance or scientific 
uncertainty an excuse for inaction? This was the real question underlying all controversies 
over whether regulations were justified or not.  
It is telling that many scientists active in the field of ozone depletion held a view about 
precautionary policies like the following: ‘I always thought that in the face of uncertainty one 
could take a prudent course of action just as a form of insurance, just like you are buying a 
fire insurance, you are not predicting that you’ll have a fire, but if there is a possibility for fire 
you can take out an insurance’ (Author interview with US scientist, November 1995; note that 
this scientist was not acting as an advocate, on the contrary, he was for some time arguing 
against theories of anthropogenic causes of the ozone hole).  
The discovery of the ozone hole was an alarm signal which changed the perception of the 
problem completely. As Rowland put it, ‘The big loss of ozone over Antarctica has changed 
this from being a computer hypothesis plausible for the future to a current reality and cause 
for concern’ (New York Times, 7 December 1986). Although it was officially not a topic in 
Montreal, it did in fact have an influence on the negotiations (Grundmann, 2001; Rowland, 
2001). Media attention rose sharply after the ozone hole had been represented as a scientific 
fact (Grundmann, 2005). 
The coloured picture of the ozone hole has become an icon to symbolize global 
environmental disasters. Before the metaphor ‘ozone hole’ came up, experts and lay persons 
from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s were concerned with a possible future ‘thinning of the 
ozone layer’. The difference between the two metaphors is evident. While the thinning 
metaphor evokes the picture of a tissue that is threadbare, the whole metaphor evokes the 
picture of a balloon which is punctured and blows up or loses its air; or an organism that got 
an infectious disease. This metaphor clearly was designed to capture the element of drama. 
Before 1985, everyone expected an ozone loss of maybe 10 or 20% in one hundred years 
(Benedick, 1991, p.13). 
In sum, advocate scientists who were able and willing to alert the public were crucial for the 
dynamic to develop. They received support from prestigious science institutions and credible 
media outlets. This put the pressure on politicians and businesses to change their course of 
action. Key to their success was the credibility they had gained during the controversy. As the 
unexpected ozone hole appeared, they were in a position to bolster their pro-regulation 
position most convincingly. 
 
 
4. Climate change 
 
We would not worry about changes in the climate system if there had not been concerned 
scientists from the climate science community going public. Likewise, the search for 
solutions to the problem of climate change gives them the role of an actor in the public arena. 
Climate change is ‘one of the most sophisticated and heated science policy controversies in 
recent history’ (O'Donnell, 2000). This is due to the fact that stakes are high, the stakeholders 
are numerous and the expert knowledge is contested (cf. Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993).  
Public concern about climate change reached a first peak in the mid 1980s. In August 1986 
the German weekly Der Spiegel featured Cologne cathedral on its cover page, submerged by 
water, adorned with the headline ‘Climatic catastrophe’ (Weingart et al., 2000). In June 1988 
NASA scientist James Hansen during a testimonial statement to US Congress stated he was 
‘99%’ certain that global warming was real has been detected, and it is changing our climate 
now’, and even more (O'Donnell, 2000). He said that ‘in my opinion the greenhouse effect  
pronounced, when he told a New York Times reporter ‘It is time to stop waffling so much and 
say that the evidence is pretty strong that the greenhouse effect is here’ (New York Times 24 
June A1, 1988).  
Hansen was not known for any partisanship on part of environmentalist pressure groups. If 
anything, he had been perceived as cautious on the issue and rather in favour of a wait-and-
see approach. Apart from these personal circumstances which lent his statements special 
weight, the fact that he spoke during a major drought was very effective. The timing of his 
appearance before the Congress committee was no coincidence but carefully staged. US 
Senator Tim Wirth had organized the hearings on global warming (see Andresen and 
Agrawala, 2002:44). This context was ideal to dramatise the issue, especially when he said 
that ‘in my opinion the greenhouse effect has been detected, and it is changing our climate 
now’, and even more pronounced, when he told a New York Times reporter ‘It is time to stop 
waffling so much and say that the evidence is pretty strong that the greenhouse effect is here’ 
(NYT 24 June A1, 1988). 
Hansen was soon to be attacked by sceptical ‘contrarians’ who described the whole issue as 
‘global warming scare’. Patrick Michaels, a professor of environmental sciences at the 
University of Virginia, and senior fellow at the conservative Cato Institute, Washington DC, 
attacked him as being the only scientist to claim that there was a cause–effect relationship 
between ‘current temperatures and human alterations of the atmosphere’ (Science,12May 
1989; see also Hansen and Michaels, 2000). 
This attack exemplifies what is at stake for individual scientists who act as advocates—they 
want to appear as objective or scientific as possible, and to avoid the impression of being 
driven by political or other motives. Hence Michaels' insinuation that Hansen does not fit 
within the mainstream of scientific opinion as being ‘the only scientist’ to claim a relationship 
between current weather and long-term trends. This allusion gets a special meaning given 
similar efforts by the IPCC to brandish contrarians like Michaels as ‘only a handful’ of 
dissenting individuals. There are statements from the IPCC to this effect and Hansen himself 
countered Michael's claim by saying that ‘the scientific community is convinced that we are 
headed for substantial climate changes in coming decades if greenhouse gas emissions 
continue to grow, as discussed by several reports by the National Academy of Sciences and 
by prestigious international organizations’ (Washington Post, 11 February 1989, A 23). 
 
4.1. Global governance and science 
 
The role of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is to review and assess 
the published scientific literature on climate change, its costs, impacts, and possible policy 
responses. It also plays a role in assessing scientific and technical issues for the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. Set up by the United Nations in November 1988, 
the IPCC was supposed to assess the state of knowledge and to ensure that global governance 
is made easier by representing important stakeholders in the assessment process. The first 
chairman of the IPCC, Bert Bolin, explained that the IPCC was designed in order to boost 
trust in the science among nations: ‘Right now, many countries, especially developing 
countries, simply do not trust assessments in which their scientists and policymakers have not 
participated. Don't you think credibility demands global representation?’ (cit. after Schneider, 
1991, p. 25). This conviction was one of the initial ideas for the intergovernmental 
organisational set-up of the IPCC and the governmental approval mechanism (Siebenhüner, 
2003; Skodvin, 2000). 
The architects of the IPCC attempt to reach a consensus view on the scientific aspects of 
global climate change as this is seen as necessary for obtaining policy decisions that are 
based on best available knowledge. In fact it was one of the lessons drawn from the 
experience of the ozone case that scientific assessments should be unified in a single 
authoritative report. This would stop the proliferation of many (potentially contradictory) 
assessments, including advocacy on both sides of the political spectrum. Technocracy was to 
cure the ills of politicised science debates. 
With the growing role played by the IPCC a dynamic has set which complicates the simple 
antagonism so apparent in the ozone case. Hybridization and purification work in a slightly 
different manner. The IPCC takes great pain to demonstrate that its assessments are based on 
the best available science. It aspires to a role Roger Pielke Jr. has labeled ‘honest broker’. 
How well the IPCC fulfils this role is debated (and Pielke doubts that the IPCC does fulfil this 
role). Some sceptics argue that IPCC science is ‘junk’, others criticize its over-reliance on 
models (Oreskes et al., 1994), and overselling the state of knowledge (Pielke Jr, 2007). Such 
critics claim that despite advances in climate science we still face big uncertainties which are 
systematically downplayed by the IPCC and that instead a consensus is ‘orchestrated’ 
(Elzinga, 1995; Oppenheimer et al., 2007). 
It has also been argued that the IPCC used simple messages in order not to confuse policy 
makers. An example is climate sensitivity which for some time was estimated at a range of 
1.5–4.5 °C as result of doubling CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere. Some have argued 
that this ‘anchoring device’ was not altered despite the fact that scientists themselves were not 
too confident about this range but they stuck with it in order not to give the impression that 
their findings were uncertain (Van der Sluijs et al., 1998).  
Like in the case of ozone depletion there is a widespread perception that science is the final 
arbiter in the climate change debate and that science will ultimately prescribe policy. Any 
criticisms levelled at the work of the IPCC are seen as attempts of undermining the political  
project of curbing GHG emissions. During the so called Lomborg controversy several 
eminent scientists attacked Lomborg for his ‘bad science’ with strong overtones suggesting 
hewas the target because of a fear of political diversion (see Lomborg, 2001 and the 
discussions in Environmental Science & Policy, Special issue on Lomborg, 2004 and in 
Scientific American, 2002 Vol. 286, Issue 1). This is a direct outcome of the linear view held 
by these scientists (a view Lomborg  hares with his opponents) which culminates in the belief 
that if there remains scientific uncertainty, carbon emission reductions are seen as not 
legitimate. 
No other than Al Gore summarized this view when saying that ‘more research and better 
research and better targeted research is absolutely essential if we are going to eliminate the 
remaining areas of uncertainty and build the broader and stronger political consensus 
necessary for the unprecedented actions required to address this problem’ (cited in Sarewitz 
and Pielke, 2000). 
Such a belief has two dysfunctional side effects. For one, it tends to marginalise other 
viewpoints which do not belong to the scientific mainstream represented in the IPCC process 
or deviating in other ways. Stifling scientific debate, it goes without saying, is problematic in 
itself. Secondly, it obscures the important lesson from the ozone case, i.e. that there is no 
need for scientific proof in order to be prudent. If decision makers and the public agree that it 
is ‘Better safe than sorry’ and that it is prudent to ‘take out insurance’ even if there is a low 





What lessons can be drawn? In both cases scientists have shaped the framework of public 
debate, either by acting in an advocacy manner or by institutionalising an assessment process 
closely linked to political decision making. There are problems with both roles. It is plain that 
advocates are vulnerable in many ways and have to take great pains to maintain their 
scientific credibility. Institutions like the IPCC on the other hand are not free from this 
problem either as they may be perceived as biased or advocates in disguise. What is more, 
they seem to be remarkably ineffective as regards political outcomes. Climate science and 
policy are still a matter for domestic policy disputes despite the fact that the IPCC is an 
intergovernmental body. As experience has shown, not all governments have taken on board 
the IPCC message (see Grundmann, 2007). And what is more, all the evidence amassed by 
the STS community notwithstanding, the linear model still has a powerful grip on participants 
in such knowledge based decision processes. This might be surprising given the relative 
failure of climate change policy so far. The reduction targets are not substantial enough in 
terms of mitigation, the problem of adaptation is not addressed and, perhaps most important 
of all, some major polluting countries have not ratified the protocol.  
The linear model could be described as ‘natural ideology’ of knowledge societies. In the case 
of climate change, those in favour of strict regulations would argue that the IPCC was 
politically effective in that it has led to ambitious goals of the EU (despite problems with the 
Kyoto Protocol) and that ‘rational policymaking’ prevailed: the best scientific knowledge is 
being been put into practice. The sceptics on the other hand could maintain that they have 
influenced US policy in abstaining from a costly and unfair climate treaty based on limited 
scientific understanding. Politicians (no matter if European or US) support such a reading, as 
science lends legitimation for political decisions. They would be loath to take sole 
responsibility for big decisions which are contested and contestable. Here it always best to 
‘shift responsibility’ to someone else, in this case to expert communities. In sum, scientists 
and politicians alike converge on an interpretation that portrays science as the final arbiter of 
contested policy issues. Even NGOs participate in this ‘scientification’ of debates by 
appointing top officers with science degrees and scientific legitimation to their ranks. 
Arguably, advocacy was more effective in the ozone case. This does not mean that the same 
model can be applied to other cases. As the climate change debate has shown from the very 
beginning, path-dependency and policy learning may well mean that several actors are keen 
to ‘fight the last war’ based on the lessons drawn. One lesson for the opponents of 
precautionary action was to insist on scientific proof to legitimize carbon controls, thus 
reversing the US Clean Air Act regulation of 1977 for CFCs. It is open to speculation that 
supporters of a precautionary US climate policy may have worked under the assumption that 
a real crisis (the occurrence of the ozone hole) would be politically most effective. As a 
consequence, scientific statements may have been over dramatised, a fact that would be 
exposed immediately by the sceptics. There are various examples of linking dramatic 
developments to climate change (West Antarctic Ice Shields, Thermohaline circulation, 
intensity of hurricanes, etc.). 
 
6. And forestry? 
 
Forestry, like climate change and ozone layer protection is an example where environmental 
protection and economic growth are not easily reconciled, where scientific expertise plays an 
important role and where international cooperation is called for. There are various forest 
governance initiatives with government involvement which are located at regional levels 
(Europe, Africa, Asia, the Americas; see Freer-Smith, 2007 for an overview). In addition, 
voluntary schemes based on the principles developed by the forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC) among others have been influential (Freer-Smith and Carnus, 2008). It has been 
claimed that the proportion of forest cover certified by such schemes globally is ca. 10% and 
has played amajor role in the recent slowing rate of forest loss between 2000 and 2005 
(Freer-Smith and Carnus, 2008:261). The world's forests influence climate through physical, 
chemical, and biological processes. There are complex and nonlinear feedback loops that are 
not well understood at present. These loops can dampen or amplify anthropogenic climate 
change (Bonan, 2008). As the special issue of Science in June 2008 exemplifies, there are 
uncertainties and we see researchers championing various positions in policy relevant issues. 
There are some advocacy scientists but their role is less pronounced compared to climate 
change. There is no equivalent of Sherry Rowland or Jim Hansen. However, there are 
attempts to replicate some of the institutionalized assessment structure that was set up for 
climate change. In fact, because of the close linkage between the two cases there is an 
overlapping jurisdiction in that the Kyoto process partly deals with forestry. In addition, the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) recently launched a 
2-year initiative to assess technical and scientific issues and new ‘policy approaches and 
positive incentives’ for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation (RED) in developing 
countries. (Gullison et al., 2007:985). 
Dimitrov (2005) has argued that ‘despite popular support for halting deforestation and despite 
consensus among governments regarding the unsustainable rates of forest degradation, 
negotiations at a number of international for a have consistently failed to produce a binding 
policy agreement.’ While industrialised states tried to launch negotiations on a global forest 
convention they did not succeed ‘due to concerted opposition by developing countries.’ Very 
much like in the case of climate change there is an Intergovernmental Panel on Forests which 
in 2000 decided to create a non-binding United Nations Forum on Forests that does not have 
a mandate for policy making.  
Dimitrov (2005, p. 105) argues that one reason for this lack of political progress lies in the 
fact that ‘there is a marked paucity of information about the non-wood benefits of forests and 
about the consequences of deforestation. The least reliable knowledge is on the shared, cross-
border effects of deforestation. Multilateral reports explicitly acknowledge that global effects 
on climate change and biodiversity cannot be measured with any degree of precision.’  
While there is a lot of data about the extent of deforestation and a general agreement that the 
main causes of forest degradation are human activities, we do not know enough about the 
‘non-wood benefits of forests’ and the corresponding consequences of deforestation.  
For example, the FAO points to the lack of understanding regarding the impact of 
deforestation on biodiversity. Likewise multilateral assessments explicitly state that ‘it is 
highly unlikely that it will be possible, in the near future, to make comprehensive inventories 
of non-wood goods and services on a global basis’ (FAO, 1995, cited in Dimitrov, 2005, 
p.105). 
Agrawal et al. (2008:1462) point out that ‘there is only partial knowledge about the 
relationships between the condition of forests, different forms of forest ownership, and the 
multiple objectives of forest governance—improvements in income, livelihoods, biodiversity, 
carbon sequestration, and ecosystem service provision.’ However, it would be wrong to 
believe that more knowledge will lead to political cooperation. More knowledge always 
increases political options and therefore provides ammunition also to those actors that want to 
resist global governance (Sarewitz, 2004). 
Dimitrov (2005:105) observes that ‘the absence of reliable information about the trans 
boundary consequences of deforestation has helped shape bargaining positions of states and 
has affected international debates at various stages.’ Many countries see forests as national 
goods with no or unknown impacts on the global commons. A principal negotiator for Brazil 
argued that ‘forests are not global commons, they are national resources.’ Production of more 
knowledge might bolster such positions as they will be able to draw on research that supports 
their interests.  
This case is very much reminiscent of early stages of the climate change issue in that a lack 
of scientific understanding is used in order to prevent efforts of global governance. The 
difference, of course, is that in the climate change case we have a clear mandate for 
international action (albeit with very modest results so far). International attempts at forest 
governance have not developed to this stage.  
Forestry does not have the element prominent in the case of ozone layer protection: there are 
no visible scientific advocates intervening in an influential way and one can only speculate 
about the effect such a presence would have made. However, civil society pressure is evident 
as can be seen from the voluntary schemes in operation (Cashore et al., 2006). There are, of 
course, reasons to be sceptical about an exclusive reliance on voluntary measures. Effective 
governance will be most likely if various measures and instruments combine in a self-
reinforcing way or if they contain a ‘strong sword’ (Arnold and Whitford 2006; Potosi and 
Prakash, 2005, 2006). NGO pressure and consumer preferences can play an important role 
(Agrawal et al., 2008; Stehr, 2007). 
It seems as if supporters of an international governance framework in forestry face no easy 
task. Both ozone depletion and climate change are seen by the UN as problems relating to a 
common pool resource (a ‘common good’) where a concerted effort by all countries is needed 
in order to protect it. Physical properties of the atmosphere (diffusion of gases) may have 
facilitated such a consensus. In forestry it is still contested if forests are a global common 
good. Knowledge claims can be used in order to enhance and to block political efforts at 
international cooperation. This should be no surprise. Many countries will continue to insist 
on their sovereignty to use their national resources, including forests, as they see fit. 
International cooperation is an intrinsically difficult process. It is unlikely that knowledge 
about feedback of deforestation on world climate or biodiversity is powerful enough to 
convince dragger countries of the virtues of international cooperation. 
Likewise, it might be that other forms of political intervention can deliver. After all, 
governance (and be it of natural resources) is always a political project—despite the 
prominent role knowledge can play in these processes. But economic and political tools 
(trade sanctions, for example) are not very attractive as they will evoke all kinds of 
accusations (neo-imperialism for example). Herein lies the promising potential of knowledge 
for decision makers as it legitimizes political decisions in a unique way. And it is no accident 
that the UN process has recently tried to bolster the element of scientific expertise through the 
Joint Initiative on Science and Technology which is supposed to assess available scientific 
information and to produce reports ‘on forest related issues of high concern’ (Freer-Smith and 
Carnus, 2008:257). 
However, this solution will only work if all parties to an international treaty agree on the 
knowledge basis and implement corresponding policies—two stark assumptions to make 
given the sobering lessons of climate change. Of course, apart from a top down international 
treaty there remains the alternative of a patchwork of various policy measures, including a 
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